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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Jack B. Parson Construction Co. ("Parson"), 
a general contractor, failed to produce bituminous surface 
course (asphalt) in accordance with contract requirements on 
a project situated on Interstate Highway 70 in Emery County. 
Parson alleged its failure was caused by an inadequate 
materials source and that the Utah Department of Trans-
portation (UDOT) had misrepresented said materials source. 
Parson demanded that UDOT issue a supplemental agreement to 
compensate for its added costs. After a period of nego-
tiations it became clear that no resolution was possible 
due to demands by Parson considered as unreasonable by UDOT. 
UDOT then ordered Parson to proceed to perform the contract 
under threat of default. Parson failed to proceed and UDOT 
declared the contract in default. Parson then sued UDOT 
alleging its faiulre to issue a supplemental agreement was a 
breach of contract and UDOT counterclaimed alleging Parson 
to be in default. UDOT also filed a third party action 
against Parsonfs surety under its performance and payment 
bonds. Each of the parties sought a determination by the 
lower Court of its legal position and alternatively an award 
of damages. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a trial to the Court in excess of three weeks 
durationf with numerous witnesses and over 200 exhibitsf the 
trial judge found in favor of Respondent and ruled that 
Parson had defaulted the contract and was liable to UDOT for 
damages. The Court al$o ruled that the Aetna Casualty and 
Surety Co. ("Aetna"), who had issued payment and performance 
bonds, was, together with Parsonf liable to UDOT for its 
damages to be determined in a later hearing. * 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an Order affirming the District Court 
Judgment which it believes to be well founded in both 
factual determinations made by the Honorable Peter F. Leary 
and the legal determinations based thereon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves close questions of construction 
contract law which turn on a careful analysis of specific 
* Note: The Court's Memorandum Decision is dated 
September 11r 1980. Written Findings of Factf 
Conclusions of Law and a Formal Judgment were 
signed and filed of record on March 24, 1981. 
UDOT thereafter relet the construction contract 
to another contractor selected by competitive 
bid on the 7th day of July, 1981. Construction 
was completed in late 1982 and further action by 
UDOT to recover damages awaits the outcome of 
this appeal. 
-2-
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facts. Appellant's Statement of Facts contains inac-
curacies, irrelevant material and requires this supplement 
to make certain that the Court clearly understands the 
strong factual as well as legal basis of the trial Court's 
ruling. 
One key provision often found in construction 
cases is a "differing site conditions" provision which 
determines what happens when actual site conditions 
encountered are other than represented. The contract 
involved herein ("contract") does not contain such a 
provision contrary to Appellant's assumption. Under UDOT 
specificationsf a contractor is allowed relief only when 
there is a "change in the plans or in the character of 
construction" which is directed by the engineer. (Ex. 1-P, 
Section 104.02(4) , Tr. 1201-1202) No change of this nature 
was recognized by UDOT in this case. 
The contract required the placement of 5" of bitu-
minous surface course (asphalt) with at least 2 1/2" to 
be placed by October 15, 1978. Liquidated damages of 
$300.00 per calendar day are specified for failure to meet 
said date. (Ex. 3-P) 
Prospective bidders are not obligated to use either 
material site on Sheet 2B, and test data shown is also 
subject to a disclaimer provision. (Ex. 1-P, Sec. 106.02) 
-3-
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Prospects 1 and 2 were previously determined to be 
acceptable in accordance with UDOTfs requirements for this 
project and for earlier projects and were used successfully 
by other contractors. (Tr. 1020-1023, Sheet 2Bf Ex. 2-P) 
PRE-BID ACTIVITIES AND PIP 
Contract provisions charge Appellant with knowledge of 
anything apparent from'a site visit. The contractor by 
submitting a bid warrants that he has "satisfied himself of 
actual conditions to be encountered." (Ex. 1-P, Sec. 
102.05) UDOT merely stated that the "quality" of materials 
was suitable "in general" and warned that furnished 
information was only "representative" and that "variations" 
should be considered "usual" and are to be "expected." (Ex. 
1-P, Sec. 106.02) A federal engineer familiar with UDOT 
specifications, this contract in particular, and how 
other States provide pre-bid information stated that UDOT's 
information regarding Pit 2 was "fairly minimal." (Tr. 1256, 
1257) He stated that Appellant "should have sought more 
information." (Tr. 1262) The phrase "acceptable in 
general" is not a guarantee and does not require UDOT to 
"bear the risk" of a contractor's failure to successfully 
use the described material. (Appellant's "Facts," P. 3) 
Appellant's pre-bid examination of the project was negligent 
and superficial. This was recognized in conversation by its 
-4-
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founder Jack B. Parsonf Sr. while talking to Duane Kern and 
overheard by UDOT's Engineer Jerry Mecham ("Mecham") prior 
to any work. (Tr. 1290-1292) Appellant's General Manager 
and Vice President John Mont Wilson ("Wilson") did not 
inquire who "previous contractors" were that had used 
Prospects 1 and 2 referred to in UDOT documents, or inquire 
as to previous problems or experience with these pits. (Tr. 
414). Wilson and Appellantfs Materials Engineer Dean 
McDonald ("McDonald") visited the construction site prior to 
bidding but did not request that Mecham be present during 
their site visitf a practice often followed. (Tr. 444-445) 
Appellant had never worked in the project area before, (Tr. 
418) and Wilson likewise lacked experience in or knowledge 
of the area. (Tr. 418-419) Wilson had been specifically 
warned of difficulties with Prospects 1 and 2 approximately 
a year earlier by Eldred Swappf a retired UDOT Engineer. 
Swapp said the pits would require adding a supplementary 
material according to his unrebutted testimony. (Tr. 1467-
1468) Mecham said he informed Wilson by telephone prior to 
bid opening that previous contractors had to blend sandy 
"filler" material into the aggregate to meet specifications. 
(Tr. 1285-1287f 1293) Wilson denied that Mecham so in-
formed him and claimed he first learned of it at the pre-
construction conference. (Tr. 1752-1753) Wilson admitted 
that he registered no objection or protest about this 
-5-
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crucial point at the said conference. (Tr. 1782-1785 & Ex. 
133-D) Both Wilson and McDonald were former UDOT employees, 
knew the type of UDOT records available, where they could be 
obtained, and that the contract invited a bidder to inspect 
them. (Tr. 417 - Wilson and 635-639 - McDonald & Ex. 3-P, 
Spec. Provision, "Bidding Requirements & Conditions, Sec. 
102.05 as changed therein.) Two contractors previously used 
Prospect 2, one used Prospect 1 and their records were 
available in Price and Salt Lake City. Appellant's 
superficial pre-bid investigation is evident in the 
testimony of McDonald. He stated there was "much 
discussion" concerning the test results on Sheet 2B with 
Wilson and what they meant. (Tr. 517) McDonald said he 
tried calling Respondent's District Materials Engineer Al 
Spensko ("Spensko") but failed to reach him. He neither 
identified himself nor requested Spensko to return his 
telephone call. He admitted he knew Spensko would have 
information concerning the pits and area geology. Although 
unfamiliar with the area, he apparently was not seeking 
geologic information. He said he knew that Prospect 2 was 
located in the Moenkopi geologic formation which is well 
known to geologists. (Tr. 634-642) Published geologic data 
of the area described this formation in detail. (Ex. 147-D) 
Available UDOT publications detailed it as well. (Ex. 191-P 
and 192-P) Said publications describe one of the members of 
-6-
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that formation as the "Sinbad limestone," Spensko and Swapp 
who are both graduate geologists confirmed that Pit 2 was 
primarily made up of the "Sinbad limestone." (Tr. 1090, 
1472-1480) Variations in this geologic layer were explained 
by another geologist. (Tr. 1720-1721) McDonald, although a 
geologist, did not discover this available information or 
its implications. 
McDonald claimed art trial that Appellant relied on 
Sheet 2B and the gradations shown thereon. His testimony in 
a prior deposition was, however, directly contrary to this 
and indicated an almost total disregard for this informa-
tion. (Tr. 541, 666-667) Appellant's Statement of Facts 
App. - Facts) claims "heavy reliance" on UDOT's repre-
sentation in Sheet 44 (Ex. 3-P) that Pit 2 was "acceptable 
in general" and then asserts that other contractors also 
relied on such representation. (Tr. 1604) The reference 
to the transcript by Appellant is a qualified statement by 
an experienced engineer executive concerning the type of 
tests a contractor relies upon and those which they do not 
rely upon. (See Tr. 1600-1604) Other contractors who 
testified indicated little, if any, reliance on the said 
gradation information. Altogether they show how misplaced 
and incompetent Appellant's claimed reliance on such 
information was. (Tr. 1580-1586; 1632; 1892-1893) Spensko 
explained that UDOT does not make an effort to present 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
information concerning gradation results which a contractor 
can necessarily correlate to. (Tr. 1529-1531) 
Appellant correctly points out that its bid was less 
than five percent below the next low bidder (Tr. 238), but 
neglects to add that it was approximately 11% under the 
engineer's estimate, or that the contractor who previously 
used Pit 2 to pave the highway originally was the highest of 
six bidders. Its bid tfas more than $650,000 higher than 
Appellant. (Ex. 6-P) 
Appellant lacked experience with limestone ledge rock 
pits. (Tr. 629-630) Such pits often create excess minus 
200 material; [Minus 200 material is extremely fine grained 
like flour. The material will pass a screen with 200 
openings per lineal inch, hence the reference to "minus 
200."]; limestones vary in grade and in hardness. (Tr. 
1720-1721r 1090) 
Appellant erroneously assumed that neither Pit 1 nor 
Pit 2 contained sufficient material for the entire job 
(P. 7, App. - Facts)r but were told before commencing 
operations in Pit 2 that Pit 1 could be expanded to obtain 
all material from said pit. (Exs. 132-D & 133-D, Tr. 470-
471) 
PERFORMANCE BY,CONTRACTOR 
A required UDOT test to determine acceptability of 
-8-
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asphalt aggregate is the Los Angeles Wear Test, or "L.A. 
Rattler Test." This standardized test measures the 
percentage of breakdown in an aggregate sample using a 
special machine. It is an indicator of how asphalt gravel 
may "wear." UDOT's upper wear limit is 40%. (Ex. 1-P, Sec. 
403.03) The L.A. Rattler Test does not measure compliance 
by a contractor. (Tr. 1592-1593) 
Contract provision^ require separation of aggregate 
material into at least two separate piles. All material has 
had to pass through a 3/4" screen (referred to as "3/4 inch 
minus"). When two piles are used, the material in one 
aggregate pile must pass through a number 4 screen (4 
openings per lineal inch) and material in the other pile 
will be retained. (This allows for variation in the size 
of material fed into the hot mix plant and assists in 
meeting a gradation specification.) 
Appellant erroneously asserts Respondent was 
responsible for its "choice of crushing equipment and its 
arrangement and organization, etc." (App. - Facts) The 
evidence Appellant cites (Tr. 216-218, 257) is Wilson's 
testimony and is his visual impressions and descriptions of 
photographic exhibits. There is nothing therein which 
points to any direction in Sheet 2B of the "Plans" (Ex. 2-P) 
or Special Provision Sheet 44, (Ex. 3-P) regarding equipment 
selection, usage of equipment, choice of either pit, 
-9-
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direction of removal of material in a pit or a requirement 
to even use either Pit 1 or 2. Appellant can use any source 
it selects, subject only to UDOT's right to test material 
for its suitability. (Sec. 106.02f Ex. 1-P) 
Appellant was late moving its crushing equipment on 
site and in commencing to pave. (Ex. 133-D, Tr. 263) The 
first pavement was placed October 5f 1978. (Tr. 263) 
Contract provisions restrict paving after October 15. (Ex. 
3-P, Sec. 403.11) Appellant sought and received permission 
to extend this deadline under certain conditions. (Exs. 12-
P and 14-P) Appellant failed to meet contract requirements 
both as to gradation of material and asphalt content based 
on random samples of in place material. (Exs. 37-P and 38-
P) Appellant"s main difficulty was a deficiency of 
aggregate which would pass a number 16 screen (16 openings 
per inch) and be retained on a 50 screen (50 openings per 
inch) or in an excess of material passing the 200 screen. 
(Exs. 37-P and 38-P) If adjustments were made to reduce the 
minus 200 material it threw the material between the 16 and 
50 screen out and vice versa. (Ex. 37-P and 38-P) This 
resulted in reduced payment for the item under contract 
formula which allows the contractor the option to remove and 
replace the material or to accept payment at a reduced unit 
price if the calculated pay reduction is not more than 30% 
of the full unit price. If the calculated reduction is over 
-10-
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30% and less than 50%, the "engineer" has the option to 
order removal of the product or allow it to remain in place. 
(Ex. 3-P, Special Provision Sheets 30-40) 
The average of individual tests of material in stock-
pile indicated a possibility of achieving specification 
gradation requirements. (Ex. 41-P) However large amounts 
of material with high amounts of fine sized materialf 
f 
e 
represented by individual samples in both piles, which 
exceeded the overall average could not have been expected to 
combine successfully. (Tr. 455, 1303-1313, Exs. 201-D, 204-
D) Mecham warned Appellant of adverse problems to be 
expected later in recombining the stockpiles due to their 
borderline make-up. (Tr. 1306-1309, 1320, 1321) Wilson 
admitted that Appellant intentionally builds borderline 
stockpiles to maximize production and that this limits the 
capability to recombine the stockpiles and achieve gradation 
specifications. (Tr. 419-422) Appellantfs stockpiles were 
not uniform in their make-up. There is over a 9 percentage 
point variation in the percent of minus 200 material passing 
the finest and most critical screen as revealed by indi-
vidual stockpile tests. (Tr. 1440-1442, Ex. 204-D) This is 
further illustrated by comparing a graphic plot of Parsonfs 
tests with those of two adjoining projects constructed at 
the same time by other contractors where uniformity is 
clearly evident. [Ex. 219-D (Parson), Ex. 220-D & 221-D, 
-11-
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Tr. 1440-1445 for detailed explanation.] Part of this lack 
of uniformity was caused by the manner in which the 
stockpiles were constructed, which resulted in degradation 
and segregation. (Tr. 1108-1111, 1391-1398) Appellants 
stockpiles were so borderline in their make-up due to lack 
of care by Appellant in their construction that they were 
into the limits of deviation allowed for contract compliance 
without any further breakdown of material normally caused by 
handling in mixing, hauling, placing and partially 
compacting, all of which occurs before compliance testing. 
(Tr. 1306-1309, 1353) Appellant's Fact Statement complains 
of "as much as 50% waste." Wilson's testimony to the 
contrary was that the overall average waste was 35 to 40 
percent. (Tr. 439) Waste amounts as high as 50% are 
normal in District 4 (Southeastern Utah) according to 
Spensko. (Tr. 1520) Contractors experienced in that area 
of the State confirm this. (Tr. 1625, 1635, 1866-1868) The 
previous contractor using Pit 2 experienced 25% waste with 
very careful control. (Tr. 1626-1627) Appellant claims to 
have expended "elaborate and costly" attempts to achieve 
compliance. (App. - Facts) Unfortunately none of these 
things worked, but Wilson admitted to a number of techniques 
that would probably have worked. (Tr. 457-459) UDOT sug-
gested a blend sand, but Appellant's lack of know-how was 
again demonstrated. (Tr. 460-463, 1333-1342, Ex. 208-D). 
i 
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Appellant's whole crushing operation suffered from lack of 
know-how. For instance, the reject system they designed to 
achieve a better product resulted in rejection of material 
of which 63% would have been in compliance. (Tr. 1322-1329, 
Ex. 205-D) On production days 5f 6, and 7, a mathematical 
analysis of the material put into the plant results in an 
expected product with 12.5% minus 200 which is what actual 
»*• 
test results revealed, but which is unfortunately well above 
specification limits. (Tr. 1342-1343, Ex. 143-P) Contrary 
to Appellant's assertions this would indicate no breakdown. 
(App. - Facts) Appellant was within compliance on produc-
tion days 4 and 5 but made further adjustments and was again 
out of compliance. (Ex. 38-P) 
Appellant refers to two problems, "excessive waste" and 
"breakdown" of material. (App. - Facts) As pointed out 
above, "waste" was probably normal for the area and "break-
down" was either not occurring or it was being controlled by 
Appellantfs efforts. 
Appellant operated a total of 7 days in two weeks 
trying to produce an acceptable paving product. It shut 
down operations on October 20, 1978. 
Appellantfs demand for a Supplemental Agreement of 
October 17, 1978 (Ex. 15-P) was not answered in writing 
until February 1, 1979. (Ex. 16-P) Frequent discussion 
occurred during the interim. (Tr. 1343) Respondent's 
-13-
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offers and concessions during the Winter of 1978-1979 were 
all attempts at compromise without jeopardy to the public or 
other bidders as explained by Bert Taylor ("Taylor"). (Tr. 
1171-1174, Ex. 105-Pf Ex. 22-P) 
One of UDOT's concessions was to core drill Prospect 2 
to determine its make-up. Appellant refers to the presence 
of 35 feet of overburden as revealed by these cores, but 
fails to mention that they were obtained some 400 feet east 
of the existing face of the pit. (Tr. 1064-1065, Ex. 40-P) 
Appellant's Superintendent knew where the "good material" 
existed before any work commenced since it was then visible. 
He further must have known that it might be necessary to go 
as deep as 36 feet "to obtain better rock." (Tr. 1298, Ex. 
111-P) Appellant's drilling company was apparently 
instructed to drill to this level as well. (Tr. 1301, 
1302^ Testimony and photographic exhibits established that 
material in Pit 2 was deposited in layers and that 
additional layers of material are encountered as removal 
proceeds to the east and that the general trend of all the 
layers is a dip to the northeast which together with the 
added layers accounts for increasing amounts of unknown 
material over the identified harder material as operations 
moved eastward. (Tr. 1080-1081) Photographs in evidence 
show a considerable quantity of large rocky material in 
waste piles which Appellant's crushing system would not 
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handle. (Tr. 1437r 1438f Exs. 216-Df 217-D) This material 
was not reduced sufficiently by blasting and was apparently 
similar to the material in the north face of Prospect 2. 
(Ex. 124-P) Investigation showed that material with low 
wear test results began at a depth of about 15 feet in Pit 
No. 2 as the face existed after Appellant shut down 
operations in October 1978, and this became the basis of 
Respondent's offer to assist the Appellant by voluntarily 
paying for removal of the top 15 feet of material. (Tr. 
920-924f 1047-1050r 1052f 1154-1156, Exs. 82-P, 114-P, 
185-D) 
Appellant's reference to an inadequate quantity of 
material in Prospect 1 has been earlier referred to as 
erroneous since it was discussed in the preconstruction 
conference. (Exs. 132-D and 133-D) One bidding contractor 
planned to use Prospect 1 for all the material. (Tr. 1580-
1586) 
Appellant criticizes UDOT for lack of testing in the 
BLM property adjoining Prospect 2 on the North. (App. -
Facts) Spensko explained why it was not necessary. (Tr. 
1080) Taylor concurred in this decision. * Appellant 
further cites delay in its availability. (Ex. 29-P) It 
UDOT subsequently let a contract to another contractor 
who completed this project in 1981 and 1982 and the 
"BLMn Property was successfully used by that contractor 
to complete the work. 
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is clear that Appellant could have used the "BLM Property" 
if they had so desired prior to formal written permission. 
(Ex. 30-P) Formal permission was received before Appellant 
walked off the job (Ex. 32-P), but Appellant wanted a 
guarantee as to the quality of the material which Respon-
dent refused to provide. (Exs. 31-P, 33-P, Tr. 386) 
Appellant alleges the Respondent refused to"budgen and 
grant a Supplemental Agreement. The evidence is to the 
contrary and shows Appellant to be the one who wouldn't 
"budge," but instead consistently held out for more and more 
concessions. Taylor's testimony clearly illustrates this. 
(Tr. 1150-1193) See also Exhibits 13-Pf 15-P, 16-Pf 18-P, 
20-Pf 21-P, 22-P, 23-Pf 25-P, 26-Pf 28-Pf 29-Pf 30-P, 31-P, 
32-P and 33-P) 
INFORMATION NQT REVIEWED BY APPELLANT 
Appellant alleges undisclosed information in possession 
of UDOT contradicted Sheets 2B and 44. Specifically Appel-
lant alleges undisclosed test data which reveal high wear 
percentages on the L. A. Rattler Tests. UDOT had complete 
records of two previous contracts which utilized Prospect 2 
and additional investigatory tests of the pit and of the 
nearby "west area." (Ex. 77-P) The location of this 
information was disclosed to bidders. (Ex. 3-P, Spec. 
Provission Sec. 102.05) Wilson and McDonald admitted they 
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knew it existed but chose to ignore it. (Tr. 417, 635-639) 
Pit 2 as viewed by Appellant was located on the north side 
of the highway. Earlier contractors started several hundred 
feet south and moved north and removed an exposed rocky 
material. (Tr. 855, 856, 862, 934, 1458, Ex. 76-P) 
Appellant now refers to isolated test results in a large 
mass of available information which Appellant earlier chose 
to ignore which show L. A. Rattler results with a wear 
percentage greater than 40%. Pit 2 had already demonstrated 
that it can produce specification material. (Ex. 22-P) It 
was established that L.A. Wear test results of the same 
sample of material can vary by as much as 3%. (Tr. 927-930, 
Ex. 81-P, 184-D) It was also shown that since Sheet 2B 
disclosed an L.A. Rattler wear percentage as high as 39%, it 
was reasonable to assume the pit contained material with a 
wear in excess of 40%. (Tr. 1260, 1531, 1599-1601) A high 
.,•1 
wear percentage is considered an advantage since it 
indicates neasy crushing." (Tr. 1591-1593, 1624) It does, 
however, require care in crushing the material. (Tr. 1594-
1596) Spensko explained why Pits 1 and 2 were designated by 
Respondent and that there was no known alternative. (Tr. 
1012-1016) Swapp's report concerning Pit 2, which Appellant 
refers to, was available on request to anyone and Wilson and 
McDonald knew State procedures required its preparation. 
(Ex. 89-P) Sheet 2B and its high L.A. Rattler percentages 
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meant essentially the same as Swapp's comments in his 
report to UDOT to a knowledgeable contractor since W.W. 
Clyde elected to avoid Pit 2 and planned to get all material 
out of Pit 1. (Tr. 1583-1587) Wear factors shown on Sheet 
2B for Pit 1 are not as high as Pit 2. UDOT's 1975 tests 
showing a high quantity of minus 200 material which -
Appellant complains about were taken some 800 to 1000 feet 
west of Appellant's work area and of the location of Test 
1A. (Tr. 1007) The 1975 tests do not indicate that they 
were "crushed ledge rock" as Test 1A does. (Ex. 77-P) Test 
lAf according to McDonald, matches the average of Tests 1, 
2, 3 and 4 on Sheet 2B. (Tr. 543) Spensko testified his 
intention was to show information on Sheet 2B which would 
illustrate what the contractor could expect to get from 
material in the exposed rock faces on the north and east. 
The 1969 tests and the one 1978 test are consistent and 
Spensko1s decision not to do further testing as required by 
UDOT's materials manual for a new pit is realistic. (Ex. 
92-P, Tr. 1000-1013, 1021-1022) Spensko further explained 
the problem with displaying historical information was in 
part due to a specification change which would affect its 
value. (Tr. 1028-1029) The "good" material was the exposed 
rock ledges which is obvious from photographs. (Tr. 808-
811, Exs. 174-Df 175-D, 177-D) 
Appellant raises concern over a wear test with a result 
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of 46.7% taken from its stockpile by the State and dated 
September 22, 1978. The State employee who performed this 
test explained that he performed it for his own information 
and that no one else was informed of the result since the 
test was not performed according to UDOTfs prescribed pro-
cedure. (Ex. 80-P, 187-Df Tr. 883-901, 936-937) The said 
test result is marked "cleaned with air," and it was 
established that sampled cleaned in this manner show higher 
percentages of breakdown than those performed according to 
prescribed procedures. (As much as 4.5%+) (Tr. 1493-1495, 
Exs. 189-Df 190-D) This information also explains why 
Appellantfs test results conducted by an independent 
laboratory yielded higher percentages than State results on 
comparable material and served to invalidate them insofar as 
comparing results with State test results. (Ex. 16-Pf Tr. 
1537-1538) 
^Appellant refers to Taylor's letter of February 7f 1979 
to FHWA as an admission by UDOT that Sheets 2B and 44 
"incorrectly identified" materials in Prospect 2. (App. 
"C") Taylor explained this conclusion was made before he 
was fully informed. Taylor further explained that UDOT had 
really "not identified" the material in question and that 
the term "incorrectly identified" was really not accurate. 
(Tr. 1173-1174f 1186, 1205-1210, Ex. 101-P) FHWA's letter 
to Taylor commenting on this matter was acknowledged as 
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correct by Taylor and it in essence points out the need for 
further pre-bid investigation by the contractor. (Ex. 102-
P) UDOT had made no effort to analyze the east face of Pit 
2 except for one test (1A, Sheet 2B) since it was not known 
what a contractor might elect to do in Pit 2 or whether Pit 
1 would be selected. UDOT had correctly identified Pit 2 as 
a whole and did not identify any one part of the pit or any 
part not readily capable of visual observation. (Tr. 966-
1000) 
Appellant's reference to Spensko1s investigation of Pit 
2 as "sloppy test procedures" (App. - Facts) is hypocritic-
al. This was the third project to use Pit 2. Spensko 
selected an area to test, and the results confirmed previous 
test results of similar formations (Tr. 1029); two con-
tractors had already successfully used Pit 2, and there 
was extensive information available to anyone interested in 
viewing it. Additional tests would have been superfluous. 
Appellant chose to ignore UDOTfs invitation to examine other 
available written information and ignored direct verbal 
communication warning of potential difficulties. (Tr. 1467-
1468r Spec. Prov. amending Sec. 102.05 of Standard Spec. -
Ex. 3-P) Appellant's lack of care in its pre-bid examina-
tion is the "sloppy procedure," if there is one. (Tr. 799-
802) 
Appellant's claim that Spensko failed to mention that 
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Prospect 2 contained silt stone and sandstone assumes that 
there was a duty to do so. Since this material was easily 
visible and in addition is described in published geologic 
literaturef Appellant could easily have acquired that 
knowledge. (Tr. 1090f 1092, 1095-1096, 1720, 1721, Exs. 
191-P and 192-P; 180-D and 195-D) 
Appellant presented two geologists who viewed the site 
*' 
r 
after it was blasted and considerable material had been 
removed. (Waggoner & Osborne) Their statements concerning 
"drastic changes in quality in a short distance" and a 
"possible fault" contrast with Respondents geologist 
witnesses; Swapp who worked the previous contract and who is 
well acquainted with the San Rafael area (Tr. 1455, 1465); 
Al Spensko who has worked in the area for years (Tr. 1092-
1095, Ex. 176-D); and William Lund, who did not view the pit 
but had extensive experience in quarry operations with 
limestone rock. (Tr. 1723-1727) These geologists saw 
little evidence of any "drastic change," or faulting. 
Waggoner was reluctant to admit the obvious presence of a 
well marked and defined layer of rock obvious in two 
different photographs since it contradicted his "drastic 
change in quality" and "possible fault" theory. (Exs. 222-D 
and 231-D, Tr. 1811-1813) There was also some question 
concerning the exact geologic strata Pit 2 was located in. 
Powell (a UDOT geologist in charge of the core drilling) 
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mistakenly labeled the limestone as Kaibab. (Ex. 40-P) 
Spensko identified it as the Sinbad limestone member of the 
Moenkopi (Tr. 1083, 1090f 1092), Swapp confirmed Spensko's 
conclusion. (Tr. 1465-1466, 1471-1475) A careful analysis 
of all this geologic testimony and documentary evidence 
merely establishes that the same material used by previous 
contractors to successfully construct two previous projects 
existed in the area of the pit that Appellant chose to work 
in but that it was covered by added layers of different 
material which Appellant made no effort to dispose of or 
adequately deal with in its crushing operation. (Tr. 1461-
1464.) These added layers were equally visible to both 
parties. (Tr. 1298-1302, Ex. 111-P) 
Pit 2 contained suitable material but required careful 
quality control in aggregate production. Appellant's manner 
of operation is not the responsibility of Respondent. 
Johnson by contrast was careful and selective in the 
material and methods it used and succeeded where Appellant 
failed. (Tr. 1460-1461r 1464) 
Pit 2 was "acceptable in general" as Respondent states 
in Sheet 44. Appellant is responsible for producing an 
acceptable product if it elects to use said source, and 
Respondent has specifically disclaimed any responsibility 
for Appellant's decisions based on such information. 
Facts in evidence support the specific findings of the 
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District Court that information supplied was accurate and 
that Appellant's problems were related to its methods of 
production, handling and storing of aggregate material. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
APPELLANTS CLAIMED RIGHT TO RELY ON PRE-
BID REPRESENTATIONS IS UNREASONABLE BOTH 
LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY. 
A. RESPONDENT'S DISCLAIMER IS VALID 
Appellant asserts that this case is controlled by this 
Court's decision in Thorn Construction Cpt Inc. yt UPQTr 598 
P.2d 365 (Utah 1979). Appellant refers to language therein 
quoted and which originates in a leading case on pre-bid 
reliance upon written information which is ffouza & McCup 
Construction Co, v,,Superior Court of San Benito County, 57 
Cal.2d 508, 20 Cal. Reptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338, 339 (1962). 
The general proposition Appellant relies upon is that: 
A contractor of public works who, acting 
resonablyf is misled by incorrect plans and 
specifications issued by the public authorities 
as the basis for bids and who, as a result submits 
a bid which is lower than he would have otherwise 
made, may recover in a contract action for extra work 
or expenses necessitated by the conditions being 
other than represented.... (Emphasis added) 
This exact language is quoted by this Court with 
approval in the case of fichocfrer Constr. Co. v, gtate of 
XUk&tU 619 P.2d 1378 (1980). 
The facts of this case show that Respondent in its 
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solicitation for bids provided certain "minimal information" 
(Ex, 2-P, Sheet 2B and Ex. 3-P, Sheet 44, Tr. 1256-1257) 
regarding two materials prospects often referred to as Pits 
1 & 2. Appellant's Vice President and General Manager Mont 
Wilson selected Pit 2 after a site visit and a brief 
conversation with Respondent's engineer in charge of the 
project, Jerry Mecham. (Tr. 223-232) 
r 
Appellant seeks to place the entire responsibility 
for its failure to produce a specification product upon 
Respondent when its choice of Pit 2 was its own, the 
direction of material removal was its own, the selection 
of equipment and method of removal of material was its 
own, all without any control or direction of Respondent. 
(Sec. 106.02, Ex. 1-P, Spec. Prov., Sec. 102.05, Ex. 3-P) 
Respondent's written representations on Sheet 2B 
specifically refer to Section 106.02 of its Standard 
Specifications entitled "Local Material Sources." (Ex. 1-P) 
This provision is referred to as a "disclaimer" and puts a 
contractor on notice that while the materials in a 
"designated source" may be "acceptable in general," the 
contractor shall "determine for himself the amount of 
equipment and work required to produce a material meeting 
specifications." It further qualifies sample information 
and warns that variations are both "usual" and "are to be 
expected." 
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essential. Such provisions make a contractor responsible 
for anything that can be learned from such site visit. This 
Court regognized this provision in the case of piqhj.flpd 
CfinBtEttctipn ,CPi .Vi.liflroac P« Stevenson* et a l .r 636 p.2d 
1034 (1981)f and Respondent's exact provision was a key 
factor in the Court's decision adverse to the plaintiff 
therein. Earlier in JUiam this Court had found its way 
around that provision on the basis of an oral representa-
tion. 
Respondent did not withhold any pertinent information 
in this case. There was, howeverr considerable information 
available concerning Pit 2. This pit had been used suc-
cessfully by two previous contractors and records concerning 
their experience was available. (Finding of Fact No. 13) 
The pit and nearby areas had been tested numerous times, 
results of which were available. Respondent's materials 
engineer in Sheets 2B and 44 provided "representative 
information.11 (Exs. 2-P and 3-P, respectively.) The 
information presented was viewed differently by other 
contractors and there was no apparent consensus of which 
items shown were more or less relevant. (Tr. 1580-1581, 
1599-1601f 1622-1623) 
The trial Court, based upon the evidence, concluded 
that the information provided by Respondent on Sheet 2B was 
accurate. Appellant admits this factf but then claims the 
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information was "extremely misleading." Respondent believes 
that this is merely a reflection of the "competitive 
bidding" process in action. No two bidding contractors saw 
the information in the bid documents the same way. Their 
experience and knowledge of techniques and geographic areas 
are all different and Appellant's lack of knowledge of the 
area and of know-how iij the type of materials may be the 
reason it failed to "successfully use" Pit 2 where others 
were previously able to do so. 
In any event, this Court has addressed the very issue 
Appellant complains of in the case of R,C« Tolm?n Constt 
C0» V» Mytpn WfltSE.Association* 563 P.2d 780 (1977) wherein 
the Court stated: 
The fault plaintiff imputes to the defendant is 
that it did not make sufficient subsurface 
investigations and include the results in the plans and 
specifications. Defendant's effective rejoinder to 
this is that the specifications spoke for themselves 
and if there was any such deficiency it was obvious to 
the plaintiff; and moreover the plaintiff chose to make 
its own field investigations and knew as much about the 
subsurface conditions as did the defendant. 
Appellant's reliance on Thoyn is misplaced since Thorp 
can be easily distinguished from this case. The three 
majority judges in XJisui concluded that a specific verbal 
representation by an employee was enough to bind the State. 
There was no "disclaimer" attached to the verbal representa-
tion. In the instant case we have a written representa-
tion which Appellant alleges to be falser but there is a 
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written disclaimer which covers the information allegedly 
relied upon. Justice Stewart in his dissent in yhorn had 
trouble with the majority's unprecedented extension of 
liability, yhoyp was a case which dealt with three issues 
on appeal.. Of the three issues the Court failed to clearly 
rule on one and as to the other two appeared to be looking 
for ways to sustain the trial Court rather than remanding 
for a new trial. In other wordsf it is submitted that the 
majority in Thorn was wrong then and the dissent was correct 
in that decision and to the extent it may appear to have any 
precedential value in this case it should be disregarded if 
not specifically overruled. It is certainly not compatible 
with YQtmgr, TQlman and most recently fij,ghlan<3 y, Stevensonr 
supra. 
The evidence fully supports the trial Court's 
conclusion that the information presented in the written 
documents is true and the State did not withhold any 
information. Appellant offered no evidence to challenge 
Respondent's testing capabilityf nor the results thereof. 
Appellant cites a line of cases which place the burden 
of inaccurate information concerning materials sites on the 
contracting agency. Perhaps the leading case concerning 
this is Haggart Construction Company v> State Highway 
Commj.ssioflf 427 P.2d 686 (Mont. 1967). The Court in that 
case in effect held the State had to accept responsibility 
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for a materials site which turned out to be unsuitable even 
though the State had a disclaimer. There the Court reasoned 
there was insufficient time for the contractor to do his own 
investigation. 
Inherent in this decision and others similar to it is 
proof that the site is not as represented in fact, which 
Respondent submits is lacking and which the Court concluded 
was not the case here. (Conclusions of Law Nos. 4 and 5) 
In the case of J,,,ft. Th,qippj>Qn $ Son?, Inc> V» SUte 
of Hawaii, 465 P.2d 148 (Hawaii 1970), the Court concluded 
that since the State had correctly indicated test results 
and made available information in its possession that it 
had no superior knowledge. That the contractor also had to 
make a site visit and therefore the State1s disclaimer was 
valid. The Court held that to hold otherwise would put the 
State in the position of encouraging careless bids by 
contractors who would then expect the State to bear the cost 
of his errors. 
The decisions in Ifijjoaji, YQUH9r and Highland. supraf 
illustrate that this Court has not decided to shift the 
responsibility for "differing site conditions" from the 
contractor to the public agency and Respondent's disclaimer 
is still valid and effective, assuming but not admitting 
that the site conditions were different than represented. 
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-..'B;. APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE INFORMATION 
READILY AVAILABLE AND KNOWN TO BE IN EXISTENCE AND 
IN THE POSSESSION OF RESPONDENT PREVENTS APPELLANT 
FROM CLAIMING THAT IT WAS MISLED 
It is not always easy to know what information is 
significant or important to a contractor* Spensko selected 
the included information from a large "menu" and tried to 
illustrate what the visible ledges were and that others had 
used the pit successfully. (Sheet 2B and Spec. Prov. Sheet 
44) Appellant now wants the Court to look over the "menu" 
and accept its choices as to what should have been on the 
"menu" earlier. The response to that is that Appellant 
failed to look at the "menu" when it could and should have 
done so which was before the meal. 
The evidence shows that Appellant and its two 
executives primarily responsible for preparing its bid knew 
very^little about the geographic area of this project and of 
the materials in Pit 2. Further, they were lacking in 
experience with quarry type pits and limestone pits in 
particular. 
Wilson and McDonald seemed to avoid even the attempt to 
gain information which they knew was available. McDonald's 
failure to identify himself or request a return call from 
Spensko graphically illustrates this fact. Wilson's failure 
to inquire who the two contractors were that had used Pit 2 
and which were alluded to in Sheet 44 when he spoke with 
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Mecham by phone prior to bidding is another illustration. 
Wilson emphasizes how critically important the materials 
were to this projectf yet was not willing to expend the 
effort to verify his conclusions concerning the information 
on Sheets 2B and 44 when, according to McDonaldf there was a 
difference of opinion between he and Wilson over what the 
test results revealed. 
Sheet 2E has an L/A. Wear Test with results of 39% 
which is 1% less than the cut-off for pit acceptance. 
Contractor witnesses explained that this indicates "easy 
crushing11 but that some breakdown should be expected. 
This information mandated additional investigationf but 
Appellant's officers elected to rely completely on their 
conclusions reached without the involvement of anyone 
familiar with the area plus the State's "minimal informa-
tion," 
^Numerous cases address this failure by Appellant to 
investigate information it knew to be available. As already 
pointed out, this Court construed the exact provision which 
is found in the contract herein as a special provision and 
which refers to information available at the District 
Office and at the State Materials Office in Highland,, 
supra. This case involves allegedly defective plans and 
specifications (actually prepared by the State and adopted 
by reference) which allegedly failed to show the presence of 
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wet saturated material. Information in the "soils report" 
at two designated locations indicated that this condition 
existed. Since the plaintiff failed to examine the records, 
the Court concluded as follows: 
... that Highland had notice of potential 
difficulties which might hinder work progress and 
that the plans and specifications were not defective 
for failure to give such notice. 
The U.S. Court offClaims has also addressed this issue 
in the case of Fljppin Materials Company Vt V*S*, 312 F.2d 
408, 414 (1963) where they state the following: 
... The fair residue of the opinion is that a 
contractor cannot call himself misled unless he has 
consulted the relevant government information to which 
he is directed by the contract, specifications, and 
invitation to bid. As we read them, the decisions of 
the Supreme Court and of this court do not permit the 
contractor to rest content with the materials 
physically furnished to him; he must also refer to 
other materials which are available and about which he 
is told by the contrat documents.... 
(This case cites these earlier decisions: po^leybach 
V., P,g.r 233 U.S. 165 (1914); ChlisUe V» P«S,r 237 
U.S. 234 (1915); p,.g, ,y. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918) 
and others.) 
The pi^ ppj-p case was recently followed in the case of 
American Electric Contracting Corp. v, U.St, 579 F.2d 602 
(1978) in which the above cited language was quoted with 
approval. 
In addition to the foregoingr there is also authority 
that the withholding of pertinent information from documents 
supplied the bidder does not relieve a contractor if the 
contractor's agents failed to investigate information that 
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was available but which the agent chose not to review. This 
conclusion was reached in the case of ^ eichmann Engineers vf 
fitafre, (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 741. This case was commented on 
in 86 ALR 3d 182 at page 272 in an annotation dealing with 
"Public Contracts and the Duty to Disclose" as follows: 
... that the state is not the guardian of every 
contractor who seeks to perform services for the public 
and at public expensef for such a concept would be 
grossly unfair to^the prudent and careful contractor 
who is frequently underbid by a careless competitor; a 
contractor who submits a bid for public work which 
proves unprofitable because of his negligence in 
failing to ascertain all the facts concerning it from 
sources readily available cannot thereafter throw the 
burden of his negligence on the shoulders of the state 
by asserting that the latter was guilty of fraudulent 
concealment in not furnishing him with information 
which he made no effort to secure for himself. The 
judiciary has uniformly distinguished between the 
misleading half-truth or partial disclosure and the 
case in which a defendant says nothing at allr remarked 
the court, adding that the general rule is that silence 
alone is not actionable. The plaintiff contractors 
reliance on the ruling in Salinas v. Souza & McCue 
Constr. Co. (1967) 66 Cal 2d 217, 57 Cal Reptr 337, 424 
P2d 921 (ovrld on other grounds Helfend v. Southern 
California Rapid Transit Dist.f 2 Cal 3d 1, 84 Cal Rptr 
173f 465 P2d 61, 77 ALR3d 398), supraf is misplacedf 
said the courtf reasoning, in partf that in the case at 
bench there was no evidence of a deliberate or 
calculated attempt by the state to create false or 
misleading information as to the subsurface conditionsf 
and that the present case was not one in which it could 
be reasonably contended that the state had a duty to 
warn prospective bidders of boulderous conditions since 
the hazard and risk of such a condition was readily 
apparent as the result of an on-site inspection. 
A recent case which illustrates the importance as well 
as the reasonableness of this approach is yri-Couqty 
Exsavatingr Inc. v. Borough Qi Kingston! 407 A.2d 462 (Pa. 
1979). This case held a contractor responsible for 
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unforeseen subsurface conditions where the contractor made 
no attempt to investigate the subsurface conditions prior to 
bidding. The Court said: 
... In effect the contractor is legally required 
to take the precautionary steps outlined in the 
contract. This fluty is reinEorceti where no 
investigation is mafle ,an<3 an experienced contractor is 
involved who hafl access to public documents describing 
the mine water levels in,the area • (Emphasis added.) 
If Respondent can 4>e said to have "withheld" pertinent 
information then Appellant's almost total lack of effort in 
securing available information falls squarely under the 
rationale of Weichmann and Xri~County, supra. 
C. SHEET 2B IS NOT IN FACT PART OF "THE PLANS." 
Appellant attacks the ruling of the trial Court that 
Sheet 2B is not part of the plans. (Conclusion of Law No. 3) 
The contract Standard Specifications (Ex. 1-P) on page 
5 under "Definitions" define the "plans" as "the contract 
drawings which show the location, character and dimensions 
of the prescribed work including layoutsr profiles, cross 
sections and other details." 
Respondent concedes that Sheet 2B is included within a 
set of sheets which are collectively labeled as "plans" as 
Appellant alleges. Respondent does notr howeverr concede 
that the said sheet in any way fits the definition set out 
above. The "work" of this project consits of certain 
repairs and improvements to a portion of the entire 22 mile 
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project roadway as well as an overlayment of "bituminous 
surface course" (asphalt paving). Sheet 2B merely 
identifies two designated materials sites which have been 
pre-tested for suitability of the material and which are 
made available for the contractor to use at his election. 
The said sheet contains a reference to Section 106.02 of the 
Standard Specifications (Exhibit 1). This section is 
entitled "Local Materials Sources" and a reading of that 
section says that "possible sources of local materials may 
be designated on the plans and described in the special 
provisions." The section then proceeds to make clear the 
fact that "designated sources" are merely optional at the 
contractor's discretion. Nothing in Sheet 2B (Ex. 2-P) or 
Special Provision Sheet 44 (Ex. 3-P) in any way obligates 
the contractor to use said "designated sources." Sheet 2B 
does not describe or locate any portion of the paving work 
or any other contract work item. (Wilson reluctantly 
admitted this. (Tr. 427-428) The plans would be fully 
complete and would still completely describe the "locationf 
character and dimensions of the prescribed work" if Sheet 2B 
were not included. 
Appellant clearly has no right to rely upon Sheet 2B as 
a part of the "plans" since said sheet is merely informa-
tional and the State has made it clear that it does not 
intend to be bound by the information shown except that 
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the tests were properly conducted and the results accurately 
recorded, but any conclusions the contractor draws from the 
information are not the responsibility of Respondent, 
The Special Provision, Sheet 44, which Appellant claims 
to rely uponf has language in the last paragraph which 
Respondent submits is dispositive of this issue* It refers 
to additional information on the "... materials prospect and 
test hole data sheet aggQIBPflJiying, the, Pl?ns for this 
project." (Emphasis added.) This indicates that Sheet 2B 
is not considered a part of the "plans." 
The trial Court likewise in Conclusions of Law Nos. 
5 and 6 concludes that the information displayed on Sheet 
2B went unchallenged as to testing procedures by Appellant 
and that Respondent did not warrant the quality or 
suitability of materials in Pits 1 and 2, and further 
incorporates the language of Respondent's disclaimer which 
effectively forecloses any right of reliance by Appellant 
on Sheet 2B. 
Contrary to Appellant's assertion that the trial Court 
erred in concluding Sheet 2B was not part of the plansf 
Appellant offers nothing to challenge this conclusion except 
that Sheet 2B is "held out" to be part of the plans. The 
fact is the trial Court is correctf Sheet 2B is not a part 
of the plans. 
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II 
PARSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT 
A. APPELLANTS FAILURE TO PRODUCE SPECIFICATION 
MATERIAL IS DUE TO PARSON'S LACK OF KNOW-HOW 
AND IS NOT DUE TO ANY MATERIAL CHANGE IN PIT 2 
There is abundant factual testimony to demonstrate that 
Parson was unable to produce a specification product in Pit 
2 because of its own negligence and lack of know-how. 
Appellant had no experience in the southeastern part of 
Utah, and very little knowledge of either rock quarries or 
limestone rock in particular. Other contractors and 
witnesses explained problems associated with both quarry 
operations and limestone quarries in particular. 
Appellant made no effort to exercise reasonable care in 
crushing, stockpiling or handling of its aggregate. Appel-
lant produced a product with little or no margin for 
deterioration or "break-down" in the material. 
Appellant's blasting operations did not adequately 
reduce the hardest materials in size so that they could be 
incorporated in the crushing system. (Tr. 1401-1406f 1437-
1438 and Ex. 216-D) Appellant knew that the best material 
existed at the bottom of the east face when it began 
operationsf yet made no effort to separate out or remove 
less desirable material overlaying the "good hard materialw 
at the bottom of the east face. 
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( 
Appellant's stockpiles were poorly constructed and 
located causing segregation and ineffecient handling. (Tr. 
13i9-1322f 1391-1400, Ex. 214-D and 215-D) 
Appellant's efforts to correct problems by use of a 
blend material were minimal and demonstrated incompetence as 
tests show they were rejecting the same material they were 
introducing in the mix which failed to cause any improvement 
in the results. 
The foregoing items fully support the Court's Finding 
of Fact No. 20 and Conclusions of Law based thereon. 
Appellant ignored warnings by Mecham that previous 
contractors had some problems in meeting specificationas and 
by Eldred Swapp in an earlier conversation warning of 
problems with the "quarry pits" on the San Rafael. They 
further failed to heed Mecham's warnings based on results of 
"courtesy tests" on the aggregate as it was produced. 
T^he most obvious indicator of Parson's lack of know-how 
is the fact that previous contractors succeeded where Appel-
lant failed in producing a specification product. (Previous 
contractors produced one stockpile and lacked the advantage 
that multiple piles with different size material gave to a 
contractor.) 
Appellant waited so long to begin crushing operations 
that it had little time to adjust for gradation problems. 
With the extra cost and problems association with paving in 
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cooler weather Appellant apparently decided to terminate 
operations and blame Respondent for its problems rather than 
find a way to meet contract requirements, 
B. CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED IN PIT 2 DO NOT JUSTIFY 
RELIEF UNDER SECTION 104.02 OF THE STANDARD 
SPECIFICATIONS. 
One of Appellant1$ central arguments is that there was 
either a material misrepresentation by UDOT or a material 
change in the contract as a result of conditions encountered 
in Pit 2 which would justify a supplemental agreement to 
cover Parson's additional costs. Appellant attacks various 
rulings of the trial Court with perhaps the central focus of 
the attack being on Conclusion of Law No. 9 which essenti-
ally holds a change in a material source does not constitute 
a "change in the plans or in the character of construction" 
such that it would justify a supplemental agreement. Appel-
lant relies on the Thorp case to support this proposition. 
This appears to be a distortion of that ruling. 
Appellant obviously assumes that Section 104.02(4) is 
something that it is not. Said section merely authorizes a 
supplemental agreement if a change in the plans or in the 
character of construction which is ordered l?v the engineer 
results in added costs to the contractor and provided 
further the contractor requests such relief. Said section 
is not a "changed conditions" provision. As part of its 
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argument, Appellant cites the case of pattpye yt Metr°-
pplitan Sewer Commissi en P£ Milwaukeer 454 F.2d 537 (7th 
Cir. 1971) in support of its position. They further 
represent that the Court in pat;t;ore was interpreting a 
"similar provision" to Section 104.02. This is not truef 
the provision in Fatfrorp is a true changed condition 
provision which covers "subsurface or latent condtion 
f 
materially different than those shown in the drawings." 
The provision reads as follows: 
Changed conditions. Should the contractor 
encounterr or the sewerage commission discover during 
the progress of the work, subsurface and (or) latent 
conditions at the site materially differing from those 
shown on the drawings or indicated in the speci-
fications, the attention of the engineer shall be 
called immediately to such conditions before they are 
disturbed. The engineer shall thereon promptly 
investigate the conditions, and if he finds that they 
materially differ from those shown on the drawings, or 
indicated in the specifications, he shall at once make 
said changes in the drawings and (or) specifications as 
he may find necessary and any increase or decrease of 
cost and (or) difference in time resulting from such 
changes shall be adjusted as provided in paragraph 19 
of this contract. 
As can be seen, this is vastly different than Section 
104.02 since it covers "latent or subsurface conditions." 
The Respondent's engineer is not allowed to compensate 
a contractor having difficulty on a project unless the 
difficulty results from a directed change by the engineer to 
either the plans or the character of construction. 
Obviously, without the engineer's involvement in actively 
directing the contractor to take an action in conflict with 
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the "plans or character of construction" the provision does 
not apply. UDOT specifications are silent on "changed 
conditions." 
This Court has previously construed Section 104.02 
strictly according to its plain language in an earlier de-
cision involving Appellant in the case of ?ack B. parson 
CQnsttUCtipn QQ* .Vt .Stjtte, Qf PUhr 552 P.2d 107 (1976). The 
Court in that decision states in pertinent language as 
follows: 
... In making a determination of whether or not 
there was an overrun or underrun ... the language of 
the above referred to specifications is controlling. 
The language is clear and unambiguous.... 
Respondent submits that the pl^in l^ngpage of Section 
104.02 rules out any possibility of its interpretation as a 
"changed condition" or "differing site condition" provision. 
It is obvious that Conclusion of Law No. 9 is well supported 
factually as well as legally. 
Appellant further asserts that since Respondent offered 
to pay Appellant for removal of 15 feet of overburden, that 
this constitutes an admission of liability and a recognition 
that conditions were different in the pit than represented. 
The fact is that UDOT made no representatins of such nature. 
UDOT represented on one test the conditions to be encounter-
ed on the east face of the pit as far as the exposed ledge 
was concerned. (Test lAf Sheet 2B and Ex. 2-P) The 15 feet 
of overburden was easily visible as photographs in evidence 
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illustrate and as testimony has also established. (Ex. 114-
P, Tr. 1048-1058) As operations proceeded to the east 
additional layers of unidentified material overlay the 
layers of material which were evident prior to the beginning 
of operations. This is illustrated by photographs of the 
roadway cut which adjoins Pit 2 on the south. (Exs."225-D, 
226-D, Tr. 1536-1537) ,It is therefore obvious that UDOT 
made no representations as to the material that Parson 
encountered, except as to the exposed faces. The proposed 
offer by UDOT was clearly made in the spirit of compromise 
and in an effort to get the Appellant back to work since 
UDOT wanted the project completed. (Exs. 20-P, 22-P) 
When it became obvious that Appellant would not be 
satisfied with this offer, UDOT then directed Appellant to 
proceed with its contract. Appellant tries to misconstrue 
this direction into some kind of a direct order for the 
Appellant to seek other sources when the correspondence can 
easily be interpreted to include Pit 1 which Appellant never 
attempted to use as well as other areas of Pit 2 which were 
in the right-of-way, and which were available for use. In 
fact, Mecham's letter of May 29, 1979 ( Ex. 28-P) in essence 
suggests that Appellant refer to Section 106.02 entitled 
"Local Materials Sources" (Ex. 1-P) and consider "all the 
options available to you." The options reasonably to be 
construed at that time are as follows: 
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1. Continue in Pit 2 by going to the east, to the 
west, or north into the "BLM" property which was then 
available. 
2. Go to Pit 1. 
3. Find an acceptable alternate source; or 
4* Any combination of the three. 
Bert Taylor's explanation of these matters is 
r 
reasonable and accurately summarizes UDOT's position during 
the period of negotiation which was essentially that Appel-
lant was not entitled to a supplemental agreement for the 
simple failure of Appellant to make specification material 
out of Pit 2, but UDOT was willing to try and find ways to 
resolve the problem so long as those ways did not include an 
ultimate increase in costs to the public. There was cer-
tainly no admission that UDOT felt itself responsible for 
Appellant's failure to produce adequate material in Pit 2. 
(Tr.^1177-1186) 
Appellant implies that there is something improper or 
incorrect about Respondent's suggestion that it should have 
contacted other contractors. Obviously, Respondent is aware 
of the noncollusion provision in its bidding documents. 
There was, howeverr ample opportunity for Appellant to in-
quire of the engineer as to the contractors who had previ-
ously worked in the areaf and since Strong Construction had 
worked in Pit 1 and was no longer bidding jobs of the nature 
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involved heref there would have been nothing improper in 
making a contact with respresentatives of that company. 
W. W. Clyde in fact did so as Mr. Blaine Clyde testified. 
Other contractor witnesses who testified described how they 
kept up with what other contractors were doing and the 
importance of this information. (Tr. 1864, 1865) 
Appellant states t^ hat "under Thornf the right 
of recovery is based on implied warranty." Evidence in the 
record supports the Court's conclusions that pertinent 
contract representations are correct. The Appellant's 
incompetence in its operations is also adequately supported 
by the evidence. The ruling in Tfroyn is therfore not 
applicable. yhoyp dealt with a verbal misrepresentation 
which doesn't exist here and won't support Appellant's 
theory anyway, as already pointed out in argument above. 
Appellant further relies on the case of fitoqk ^ d 
GrQVer Ingt V«,UtS> 493 F.2d 629 (Court of Claims, 1974). 
(It alleges that this case is extremely close to the case at 
hand.) Respondent disagrees as that is a federal case and 
it involves a true "changed conditions" clause. 
It also discusses "mutual mistake of fact" as a basis 
for allowing recovery. In the instant case there was no 
mistake of fact by Respondent since it never represented to 
a bidder the exact conditions in either of the material 
sources. This is evident from the number, location, and 
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type of tests conductedf as well as the disclaimer provision 
under which the information was supplied. The brief 
narrative found in Sheet 44 invited further inquiry or 
investigation. In StQCK, and Gr.QVer supra, there was 
evidence of a very careful pre-bid investigation by the 
contractor which is in stark contrast to the facts in this 
case. In fact, even a''cursory reading of said case reveals 
little similarity between it and this case either legally or 
factually. 
CPWaPSIPN 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Judgment of 
the Honorable Peter F. Leary in this matter should be 
sustained. It is well founded factually and legally. 
Obviously, the parties to this litigation are very 
concerned about the ultimate outcome of this matter. The 
record reflects the concern of the Trial Judge as well. 
Appellant has attempted to place full responsibility 
for its failure to perform upon Respondent and asks that the 
Court grant relief upon its allegations that Respondent 
misrepresented "designated materials sources." It further 
would have this Court disregard the evidence that Appel-
lant's lack of performance was due to its own negligence or 
incompetence. Likewise, it asserts that this Court should 
disregard the written disclaimer which covers the informa-
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tion provided to bidders by Respondent. 
Appellant in its Conclusion to its Brief on Appeal pays 
lip service to the concept of competitive bidding but then 
goes on to state what it perceives is the government's 
responsibility. 
Appellant says nothing about the contractor's 
responsibility which i^ * to make a careful site visit and 
reasonable investigation of bid documents and a careful 
analysis prior to submitting a bid. Further, the successful 
bidder then has the duty of performing in a good workmanlike 
manner, promptly, and in accordance with the plans and 
specifications. 
Appellant obviously failed in its responsibility at 
every stage; its pre-bid investigation was superficial; its 
analysis of bid documents lacked competence as confirmed by 
its owner and founder; its real performance began far too 
late in the season and was obviously disorganized; its chief 
problem in failing to meet gradation requirements was due to 
its lack of care and competence in selecting materialf in 
crushing itr in handlingr in mixingf and in hauling and 
placing; its attempts at correcting problems were half-
heartedf disorganized and incompetent. 
From a legal standpoint Appellant failed to investigate 
available information which it knew existed and is thus 
foreclosed from claiming that it was misled since even a 
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cursory review of said information would have disclosed that 
its optimistic assumptions based on its superficial review 
was erroneous. In addition, Appellant's Vice President 
Wilson had been specifically warned concerning possible 
gradation problems by two State officials which put Wilson 
on a duty to inquire further. Finallyr Respondent's in-
formation as set out in pre-bid documents was in fact 
true. Its disclaimer even though somewhat generalf is 
adequate to place the burden on Appellant which is in 
accordance with virtually every significant construction law 
case in this State except for the split decision in Thorn, 
supra. Contrary to Appellant's assertions there is no 
"changed conditions" provision which applies in this casef 
nor do the facts justify any legal relief. 
The competitive bid process does not mean that a 
contractor can expect to be rescued for claiming misrep-
resentation unless his reliance was "reasonable." Ob-
viously, in Utah this means that representations in pre-
bid documents convered with a disclaimer are not a 
guarantee. 
Finally, the Appellant has failed to explain how 
Respondent's pre-bid documents can be considered erroneous 
since it failed to produce a specification product when 
others using the same source were able to. 
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( 
The Judgment should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of June, 1983 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
LELi 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF HAIMNg 
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent were mailed first class, postage pre-
paidf to John P. Ashton and James A. Boevers of Prince, 
Yeates & Geldzahler, Third Floor Mony Plazar 424 East Fifth 
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